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PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
In determining the reach of constitutional tort liability, the Supreme
Court has traditionally balanced the goals of deterring constitutional
misconduct and compensating those whose rights have been violated
against the governmental interest in ensuring that public officials are not
unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties.' I have previously
argued that those competing interests are best accommodated by holding
supervisory government officials liable for the constitutional misdeeds of
their subordinates so long as the supervisors themselves were personally
culpable-that is, at least negligent-and so long as their negligence
caused the deprivation of constitutional rights.2 Although this question
has generated some controversy in academic circles,3 lower court
decisions prior to Ashcroft v. Iqba generally acknowledged the concept
of supervisory accountability, though differing on the appropriate
standard of liability.5
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court disagreed, of course,
apparently rejecting the notion of supervisory liability for both Bivens
and § 1983 suits.6  Specifically, the Court held that constitutional tort
liability hinges on proof that each defendant, "through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution."7 The sole rationale the
Court offered for this decision was its desire to avoid vicarious
liability-to ensure that all government officials, their "title
notwithstanding," are responsible only for their "own misconduct" and
not for "the misdeeds of their agents." The Court's cursory treatment of
1. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 814 (1982) (noting that while
"an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees... , there is the danger that fear of being sued will 'dampen the
ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties"') (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581
(2d Cir. 1949)); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-56 (1980).
2. See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in Section
1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147.
3. See Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983
Litigation, 68 IOWA L. REv. 1, 12 (1982) (taking the position that § 1983 requires that a
supervisor "must personally violate the constitution as well as cause [the plaintiffs]
constitutional deprivation through [a subordinate's] intervening unconstitutional
conduct").
4. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
5. See Kinports, supra note 2, at 153-56. For further discussion of this case law,
see infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
6. 1qbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49. The suit was filed against federal officials pursuant
to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but consistent with its
traditional view that Bivens claims are the "'federal analog to suits brought against state
officials"' under § 1983, the Court indicated that its discussion of supervisory liability
applied to both Bivens and § 1983. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948, 1949 (quoting Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006)).
7. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
8. Id. at 1949.
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this issue, without the benefit of briefing or oral argument,9 seems to
make an unwarranted leap from the importance of personal culpability to
the conclusion that government officials may not be held liable for
constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates.
The same competing policy concerns animate the Supreme Court
jurisprudence governing the qualified immunity defense. o It is therefore
tempting to criticize Iqbal's analysis of supervisory liability on the
grounds that qualified immunity sufficiently addresses the relevant
governmental interests and protects high-ranking public officials. But
that objection is itself subject to challenge given the complications that
arise in applying the qualified immunity defense to supervisors." In
such cases, the relationship between the substance of the particular
constitutional right violated by the subordinate official and the
supervisory liability standard creates confusion as to precisely what must
be "clearly established" in order to immunize a supervisory defendant.
This article explores the difficulties surrounding the qualified immunity
inquiry as it applies to supervisors, evaluating whether they help justify
limits on the scope of supervisory liability.
Initially, however, Part I of the article critiques Iqbal's discussion of
supervisory liability, responding to the Court and those who have
defended its ruling and arguing that there is no justification for
abandoning the doctrine of supervisory liability. Part II then turns to the
qualified immunity defense and the federal courts' analysis of immunity
issues in litigation involving supervisory officials. In the end, the article
is critical of the bifurcated approach to qualified immunity adopted by
some courts, which immunizes a supervisor unless both the subordinate's
constitutional violation and the supervisor's liability for that violation are
clearly established. The interests underlying the immunity defense are
adequately accommodated, the article concludes, if qualified immunity is
9. See id. at 1955-57 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting in addition that "the parties
agreed as to a proper standard of supervisory liability," given the concession by Ashcroft
and Mueller that "they would be subject to supervisory liability if they 'had actual
knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects . . . and
they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination"') (quoting Brief for Petitioners
at 50); Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court's Legislative Agenda to Free Government
from Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2010)
(pointing out that Iqbal is the most recent in a series of Supreme Court decisions which
have adopted limits on constitutional tort remedies that were never argued by the parties).
10. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 813-14, 818 (1982) (defining
qualified immunity to protect public officials unless they violated "clearly established"
rights); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
11. See Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory
Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 279, 304 (2010) (commending Iqbal for
"simpliflying] what would otherwise be a complicated qualified immunity inquiry").
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denied to a supervisor who is deliberately indifferent to a subordinate's
violation of clearly established constitutional law. Finally, Part III
assesses the impact of the Iqbal decision on efforts to hold supervisors
accountable for constitutional wrongdoing, explaining that the Court may
not have intended a wholesale reworking of the doctrine of supervisory
liability.
I. IQBAL AND SUPERVISORY LIABILITY
A. The Law Before Iqbal
Prior to last year's ruling in Iqbal, the only time the Supreme Court
had spoken directly on the subject of supervisory liability for
constitutional torts was its 1976 opinion in Rizzo v. Goode.12 One of the
Court's rationales for reversing the injunction issued against the mayor
of Philadelphia and other high-ranking city officials in that case was the
absence of "an affirmative link" between the individual acts of police
misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs and "the adoption of any plan or
policy by [the supervisors]-express or otherwise-showing their
authorization or approval of such misconduct."' 3  Two years later, in
holding that § 1983 was not intended to impose respondeat superior
liability on cities, the Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services
observed that Rizzo "appear[ed]" to reject the argument that § 1983
liability can be premised on "the mere right to control without any
control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to
supervise."l 4
Following the Supreme Court's pronouncements in these two
decisions, the federal courts unanimously took the position that
supervisory government officials could not be held liable for their
subordinates' constitutional misdeeds on a respondeat superior basis.15
Rather, the courts interpreted Rizzo's requirement of an "affirmative
link" between the supervisory official and the constitutional violation
12. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976) (discussing complaint alleging a
"pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers" in
Philadelphia).
13. Id. at 371.
14. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182
(9th Cir. 2007); Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006);
Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005);
Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 761 (8th Cir. 2003); Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).
1294 [Vol. 114:4
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committed by her subordinate as the touchstone for supervisory
liability.16
Nevertheless, the courts of appeals disagreed as to the appropriate
standard of liability to be applied in constitutional tort cases filed against
supervisory officials. In many cases, the courts indicated that a
supervisor could be held responsible for the constitutional wrongdoing of
her subordinates if she acted recklessly or with deliberate indifference to
the plaintiffs constitutional rights.' 7 At times, the courts seemingly
spoke in more demanding terms, requiring evidence that the supervisor
knew of and acquiesced in the constitutional violation.'8 Finally, at least
one court appeared willing to impose liability based only on a finding of
gross negligence on the part of the supervisor.' 9
Although language appears in some of these opinions that
ostensibly foreshadows Iqbal's holding that the supervisor must herself
violate the Constitution, these courts did not view that requirement as
inconsistent with the doctrine of supervisory liability. Rather, they took
the position that a supervisor did act in violation of the Constitution by
satisfying the standard of supervisory liability.20 Despite differences in
16. See, e.g., Sema v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006);
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
17. See, e.g., Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182
(9th Cir. 2007); Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006);
Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005);
Ottman v. City of Independence, 341 F.3d 751, 761 (8th Cir. 2003); Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (1lth Cir. 2003); Doe v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th
Cir. 2002); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001); O'Neill v.
Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2000).
18. See, e.g., Morfin v. City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1001 (7th Cir. 2003)
(requiring that supervisory defendants 'must know about the conduct and facilitate it,
approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see"') (quoting
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)); Doe v. City of Roseville,
296 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2002).
19. See, e.g., Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002). But cf id. (noting
that "[w]e have often equated gross negligence with recklessness").
20. See, e.g., Serna, 455 F.3d at 1151 (requiring that "the plaintiff must establish .'a
deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate constitutional rights,'"" but going
on to explain that "[iun order to establish a § 1983 claim against a supervisor for the
unconstitutional acts of his subordinates, a plaintiff... must show an 'affirmative link'
between the supervisor and the violation, namely the active participation or acquiescence
of the supervisor in the constitutional violation by the subordinates") (quoting Jenkins v.
Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994-95 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977
F.2d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1992))); Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, 406
F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that "[p]laintiffs must show that the conduct of the
supervisors denied Davis his constitutional rights," but then recognizing that "[wihen, as
here, a plaintiff alleges a failure to train or supervise, 'the plaintiff must show that: (1) the
supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link
exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiffs rights;
and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference"') (quoting
Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1998)); Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d
12952010]
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the precise standard of liability, then, the courts of appeals unanimously
were of the view that high-ranking public officials could be held
accountable for the constitutional misdeeds of their subordinates.
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Iqbal
In calling into question this prevailing wisdom (without as much as
even citing to Rizzo), the Supreme Court tied its reservations about
1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the "first step ... is to determine whether the
factual allegations in the complaint, if true, establish a constitutional violation" by the
supervisory defendants, but finding that requirement satisfied if the plaintiffs rights were
violated and "the defendants' supervisory actions caused the alleged deprivations"); Doe
v. City of Roseville, 296 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2002) (observing that the relevant
"inquiry ... is whether [the plaintiff] has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right
by [the supervisory] defendants," but then reasoning that "[bjecause the plaintiff sought
to hold school administrators individually liable for constitutional injury caused directly
by someone else, . . . "'supervisory liability" standards apply to resolve the claims')
(quoting Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 513 (6th Cir. 1996)); Poe v. Leonard,
282 F.3d 123, 145, 140 (2d Cir. 2002) (requiring that a supervisor have "notice that his
actions or omissions rose to the level of a constitutional violation," but holding that "a
supervisor may be found liable for his deliberate indifference to the rights of others by his
failure to act on information indicating unconstitutional acts were occurring or for his
gross negligence in failing to supervise his subordinates who commit such wrongful
acts"); Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 1994) (pointing out that "[a]
supervisor who has been apprised of unlawful harassment ... should know that her
failure to investigate and stop the harassment is itself unlawful" under the Equal
Protection Clause).
Moreover, a number of lower courts prior to Iqbal did not speak at all in terms of a
supervisor violating the plaintiffs rights herself; they thought it sufficient that the
supervisory official caused the constitutional violation committed by her subordinate.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001) ("A sheriff not
personally involved in the acts that deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights is
liable under section 1983 if: 1) the sheriff failed to train or supervise the officers
involved; 2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train
and the alleged violation of the plaintiffs rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise
constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs constitutional rights."); Blyden v.
Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Given the lack of respondeat superior
liability under Section 1983, a supervisor's liability is not for the use of excessive
force . .. but for distinct acts or omissions that are a proximate cause of the use of that
force."); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 456 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
("Although supervisory officials cannot be held liable solely on the basis of their
employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor, they may be liable when their own
action or inaction, including a failure to supervise that amounts to gross negligence or
deliberate indifference, is a proximate cause of the constitutional violation."); Shaw v.
Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) ("We have set forth three elements necessary to
establish supervisory liability under § 1983: (1) that the supervisor had actual or
constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed 'a
pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff, (2)
that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show 'deliberate
indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,' and (3) that there
was an 'affirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the particular
constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.").
1296 [Vol. 114:4
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supervisory liability to the long-established principle that Bivens and
§ 1983 were not meant to impose respondeat superior liability. "Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable," the Iqbal Court held, "a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." 2 1 In constitutional
tort litigation, "where masters do not answer for the torts of their
servants," the Court continued, "the term 'supervisory liability' is a
misnomer."22
As Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, however, the majority's
conclusion "rests on the assumption that only two outcomes are possible
here: respondeat superior liability .. . or no supervisory liability at all."23
But that "dichotomy is false," the four dissenters succinctly noted.24 A
supervisor who is held accountable because she was deliberately
indifferent to her subordinate's constitutional wrongdoing (or because
she was aware of and acquiesced in it) is not being punished on a theory
of vicarious respondeat superior liability.25 Rather, she is being held
responsible for her own misdeeds-i.e., her failure to properly supervise
her subordinates.
C. Section 1983's Language and Legislative History
A more thorough defense of the majority's position in Iqbal has
been offered by Sheldon Nahmod. Professor Nahmod takes a brief stab
at defending Iqbal based on the language and legislative history of
§ 1983 .26 But even he acknowledges that the terse statute-consisting of
only some eighty words2 7 -iS "not conclusive" 28 and that at best Iqbal's
discussion of supervisory liability is "not inconsistent" with the statutory
language. 2 9
Section 1983 expressly imposes liability on "[e]very person" acting
under color of state law who either "subjects" the plaintiff to a
deprivation of rights, or who "causes [the plaintiff] to be subjected" to
21. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
22. Id. at 1949.
23. Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Cf Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serys., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (defining respondeat
superior liability as holding a city responsible "solely because it employs a tortfeasor").
26. Although these statutory interpretation tools are directly relevant only to § 1983
claims and not to Bivens suits, the Court has traditionally interpreted § 1983 and Bivens
to provide parallel causes of action against state and federal officials. See supra note 6.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). The word count excludes the final clause pertaining to
injunctive suits filed against judicial officers, which was added in 1996 to overturn the
Court's ruling in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
28. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 299.
29. Nahmod, supra note 3, at 18.
12972010]
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such a deprivation.30  The statutory language thus envisions that a
supervisor who can be said to have "caused" a constitutional violation
may be held liable. By providing that constitutional tort liability extends
to a government official who "causes" a deprivation of constitutional
rights, the statute as written requires only that plaintiffs demonstrate
culpability on the part of each defendant, as well as a causal link between
that defendant and the constitutional violation.3 1 Thus, as Nahmod
points out, "section 1983's causation language, on its face, admittedly
does not require that [the defendant] must personally violate [the
plaintiffs] constitutional rights."32
Nahmod likewise concedes that the sparse legislative history
surrounding a bill that was passed quite hurriedly 33 "does not explicitly
address the issue."34 Although he maintains that § 1983's history is "at
least suggestive" of the approach adopted in Iqbal,35 the evidence he
cites in support demonstrates only that the statute was enacted in order to
enforce the Constitution and provide a remedy for constitutional
violations-goals that are also (and arguably more fully) accomplished
by a meaningful doctrine of supervisory liability. Moreover, the
immediate impetus for § 1983, originally § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
1871, was the rampant violence committed by groups like the Klan, even
though the statute was "not directed at the perpetrators of these deeds as
much as at the state officials who tolerated and condoned them."37
Imposing liability on government actors who "tolerate" and "condone"
their subordinates' constitutional misconduct certainly does not seem
inconsistent with this history. As with many of the issues that arise in
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
31. Cf Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (interpreting this
language as "plainly impos[ing] liability on a [municipal] government that, under color of
some official policy, 'causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights").
32. Nahmod, supra note 3, at 18.
33. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 665 (observing that the bill was passed within three
weeks of its introduction and was "the subject of only limited debate").
34. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 298.
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
37. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 n.1 1 (1989); see also Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 611 n.25 (1979) ("The Act of 1871, known as the Ku
Klux Klan Act, was directed at the organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South led
by the Klan, and the unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the widespread
violence."); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (documenting Congress'
concern that "state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals," and citing
Rep. Perry's famous statement: "' [s]heriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having
ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as
if they might be accomplices') (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 78
(1871)).
38. I am indebted to Gary Gildin for this insight.
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§ 1983 litigation, then, Congress apparently left to the courts the task of
developing the law governing supervisory liability as a matter of
policy.39
D. Policy Considerations
As I have previously argued, the twin goals of constitutional tort
remedies, compensating victims of constitutional wrongs and deterring
future violations, 40 are best achieved by affording plaintiffs a remedy
against supervisory officials.4 1 Those individuals tend to have the power
and resources required to implement the reforms necessary to curb
additional wrongdoing, and exposing them to liability furnishes the
incentive to do so.
Professor Nahmod likewise agrees that supervisory liability "clearly
further[s] [the] compensatory and loss-spreading functions" of
constitutional tort liability.42 Nevertheless, his central policy thesis is
that the Iqbal decision "provides a better fit between § 1983's policy
considerations and damages liability for Fourteenth Amendment
violations," "neither over- nor under-protect[ing]" constitutional rights. 43
When supervisory liability is limited to situations where the supervisors
themselves violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights, Nahmod
explains, "the supervisory defendant's fault is derived from the
Constitution alone and not from § 1983 or federal common law."4
Although, as Professor Nahmod rightly points out, the Supreme
Court has said that § 1983 does not itself "provide for any substantive
rights," but merely supplies a remedy for rights guaranteed by the
Constitution,4 5 the supervisory liability doctrine in effect prior to Iqbal
did not create any substantive rights. Rather, consistent with the
Supreme Court's reading of § 1983, it merely gave those who were
deprived of their constitutional rights a remedy, not only against the
39. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light
on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 603 (1985) (describing § 1983 as "[1laconically
drafted" and "a blank canvas upon which the federal courts must sketch the details of a
cause of action"); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section
1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 760 (1992) (calling § 1983 "almost entirely a
judicial construct").
40. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-56 (1978).
41. See Kinports, supra note 2, at 185-88 (concluding that constitutional tort
jurisprudence is "somewhat aberrational" compared to other areas of law "in that it has
created barriers making it difficult to sue both public employers and supervisory
officials").
42. Nahmod, supra note 3, at 22.
43. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 303, 304.
44. Id. at 295-96.
45. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979).
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subordinate official who violated those rights directly but also against
any supervisor who could be deemed responsible for the constitutional
wrongdoing. The doctrine of supervisory liability did not "alter
[§ 1983's] procedural character"6 any moreso than the Court's
municipal liability decisions, which impose § 1983 liability when
constitutional injury results from either a city's "official policy or
custom" 47 or from a failure to train municipal employees that "amounts
to deliberate indifference" to the plaintiffs rights.48
The final justification Nahmod offers in support of the Iqbal
decision relates to the relationship between qualified immunity and
supervisory liability. That issue is the subject of the next section.
II. SUPERVISORY LIABILITY AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
A major theme running through the decision in Iqbal is the Court's
desire to protect high-ranking government officials so they are "neither
deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties.A 9
"Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the
law," the Court explained, "exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and
expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be
directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government."so
These very same concerns have historically informed the Court's
qualified immunity jurisprudence.
As articulated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the qualified immunity
defense protects executive-branch officials from liability so long as
"their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
46. Id.
47. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that "it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983"). Professor Nahmod
views Monell's official policy requirement as "equivalent, for constitutional
accountability purposes," to "the personal involvement requirement for individual
liability." Nahmod, supra note 11, at 308. But that begs the question as to precisely how
the "personal involvement" requirement is properly satisfied for supervisory officials.
48. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (refusing to limit municipal
liability to cases involving unconstitutional city policies). See Karen Blum, Qualified
Immunity: The Constitutional Analysis and Its Application, 20 ToURo L. REv. 643, 670
(2004) (observing, prior to Iqbal, that "supervisory liability cases ... are decided ... in
very much the same way as City of Canton liability against an entity is handled");
Nahmod, supra note 11, at 305-08 (acknowledging the discrepancy between City of
Canton and Iqbal). But cf Kinports, supra note 2, at 162-69 (arguing that courts need not
blindly apply the rules governing municipal liability to cases brought against supervisors,
and instead can justifiably impose a stricter standard of culpability on supervisors, given
the protections afforded to individual defendants by the qualified immunity defense).
49. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
50. Id. at 1953.
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.""
The constitutional right asserted by the plaintiff, the Court subsequently
explained in Anderson v. Creighton, must have been "clearly
established" in a "particularized" and "fact-specific" sense: "[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 5 2
The qualified immunity defense was initially created," and over the
years has been reformulated 54 and refined," for the express purpose of
"shield[ing] [government officials] from undue interference with their
duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." 56 Moreover,
the Court has interpreted the immunity defense with an eye towards
"permit[ting] the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial,"
51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
52. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987). Although the language
quoted in this paragraph (and similar language appearing in other qualified immunity
decisions) speaks in terms of an individual defendant's actions violating the Constitution,
these cases did not raise the question of supervisory liability that came before the Court
in Iqbal-and certainly the Iqbal majority did not claim that its earlier decisions settled
the issue.
53. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (interpreting § 1983 to allow
police officers to raise the common-law defense that they "acted in good faith and with
probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid,"
reasoning that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being
charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and
being mulcted in damages if he does"). But cf James E. Pfander, Iqbal, Bivens, and the
Role ofJudge-Made Law in Constitutional Litigation, 114 PENN ST. L. REv._1387 (2010)
(pointing out that the creation of immunities was a congressional function in the
nineteenth century, not a judicial one).
54. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 816-17 (explaining the decision to abandon
the subjective element of the prior two-pronged definition of qualified immunity by
noting that "substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of
government officials," "questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by
summary judgment," and "[j]udicial inquiry into subjective motivation ... may entail
broad-ranging discovery" that "can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government").
55. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (justifying the decision
to backtrack from the requirement set out in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),
that courts ruling on qualified immunity motions must first address the "threshold" issue
whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, in part on the grounds that
"Saucier's two-step protocol 'disserve[s] the purpose of qualified immunity"' by
"forc[ing] the parties to endure additional burdens of suit ... when the suit otherwise
could be disposed of more readily") (quoting Brief for National Ass'n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae at 30); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640-41
(adopting a "particularized," "fact-specific" approach to qualified immunity because a
standard applied at a high "level of generality" would enable plaintiffs "to convert the
rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by
alleging violation of extremely abstract rights").
56. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 806.
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thus safeguarding public officials not only from damages awards but also
from "the costs of trial" and "the burdens of broad-reaching discovery."
Given the substantial protections already afforded public officials-
including supervisors-by the qualified immunity defense, 5  Iqbal is
open to criticism on the grounds that going further and limiting the reach
of supervisory liability is unnecessary and strays too far from an
equitable balance of competing interests. Nevertheless, Professor
Nahmod defends the Iqbal Court's treatment of supervisory liability on
the grounds that it "simplifies what would otherwise be a complicated
qualified immunity inquiry."5 9 Under the supervisory liability rules
endorsed by the lower courts prior to Iqbal, he continues, "the qualified
immunity inquiry must take account not only of the constitutional norm
applicable to the subordinate but also the deliberate indifference of the
supervisor." 6 0  By contrast, under the Iqbal Court's approach, the
question is "whether the supervisor violated clearly established
constitutional law at the time of his or her conduct," thus focusing
exclusively-and "appropriately" in his view-on "the constitutional
norm applicable to the defendant's conduct."6  As detailed below,
however, the lower courts' experience applying the doctrine of qualified
immunity in cases involving supervisors does not substantiate Nahmod's
concerns.
Prior to Iqbal, some federal appellate courts that expressly
addressed the relationship between supervisory liability and qualified
immunity applied "a bifurcated 'clearly established' inquiry-one branch
probing the underlying violation, and the other probing the supervisor's
57. Id. at 817; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (noting that
"[tihe basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the
concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery"') (quoting Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
58. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An
Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 667, 692 (2009) (finding, in random sample of
qualified immunity opinions decided by federal courts between 1988 and 2006, that
immunity was denied in only about 20% to 30% of the cases); Greg Sobolski & Matt
Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and
Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REv. 523, 546 (2010) (reporting that
qualified immunity was denied in about one-third of a random sample of nine hundred
§ 1983 decisions issued by the federal appellate courts between 1976 and 2006). But cf
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences
for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REv. 809, 845 (2010) (finding that only
two percent of the Bivens-claim dismissals in five federal districts between 2001 and
2003 were due to qualified immunity).
59. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 304; see also Nahmod, supra note 3, at 22 (criticizing
supervisory liability on the grounds that it "inevitably tends to confuse the section 1983
prima facie case with the qualified immunity test").
60. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 304.
61. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis omitted).
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potential liability."62 Under this approach, a supervisory official was
denied qualified immunity only if both "(1) the subordinate's actions
violated a clearly established constitutional right, and (2) it was clearly
established that a supervisor would be liable for constitutional violations
perpetrated by his subordinates in that context."63  Picking up on
Anderson v. Creighton's instructions, these courts required that both
prongs of the bifurcated immunity standard be applied in a
"particularized" and "fact-specific" manner. 4 As a result, a supervisory
official did not lose qualified immunity simply because the standards
governing supervisory liability were clearly established as an abstract
matter-that is, the court's precedents imposed liability on supervisors
who were deliberately indifferent to the constitutional misdeeds of their
subordinates. Rather, a supervisor could take advantage of the qualified
immunity defense unless it was clearly established that her failure to
supervise the offending subordinate satisfied the deliberate indifference
standard on the facts of the particular case.65
62. Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998). For the Third Circuit's
contrary view, see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
63. Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d at 6; see also Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123,
134 (2d Cir. 2002) (requiring that "both laws were clearly established to lay the predicate
for demonstrating that [a supervisor] lacked qualified immunity: the law violated by [her
subordinate] and the supervisory liability doctrine under which [the plaintiff] wishes to
hold [the supervisor] liable"); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 455 (5th Cir.
1994) (en banc) ("Under the shield of qualified immunity, [the supervisory officials]
cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless (1) Jane Doe's liberty interest under the
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) [the
supervisors'] duty with respect to Jane Doe's constitutional right were 'clearly
established' at the time these events took place."); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 801 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that Sergeant Stroud was entitled to qualified immunity unless "(1) it
was 'clearly established' at the time of [Officer] Morris' conduct that Stroud could be
held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by Morris; (2) it was
'clearly established' at the time Stroud was supervising Morris that the degree of force
that Stroud knew that Morris was using against arrestees was unconstitutional; (3) a
reasonable person in Stroud's position would have known that his actions were
unlawful").
64. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987).
65. See, e.g., Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d at 140-41 (observing that "we must
determine whether it has been clearly established that Leonard's failure to supervise Pearl
more closely would violate Poe's rights in the particularized context of the facts at
hand"); Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d at 7 (noting that "the qualified immunity
analysis here turns on whether, in the particular circumstances confronted by each
appellant, that appellant should reasonably have understood that his conduct jeopardized
[the plaintiffs] rights"); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 456 (finding that
"[t]he plaintiff in this case has adduced clear summary judgment evidence of deliberate
indifference by defendant Lankford toward her constitutional rights"); Shaw v. Stroud, 13
F.3d at 802 ("In light of the clearly established standard governing supervisory liability, a
reasonable person in Stroud's position would unquestionably believe that his conduct
violated clearly established law regarding the contours of supervisory liability.").
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The balance the Supreme Court's qualified immunity decisions have
struck between compensating plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional
injury, on the one hand, and protecting public officials from the costs of
litigation, on the other, emphasizes the importance of giving government
officials notice when they are exposing themselves to liability and thus
protecting them from being held accountable for "reasonable mistakes." 66
As the Court indicated in defining the "fact-specific" and
"particularized" approach it endorsed in Anderson v. Creighton, "[t]his is
not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but
it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent."6 7 Likewise, the Court noted in Harlow v. Fitzgerald that the
qualified immunity defense "focuses on the objective legal
reasonableness of an official's acts" but "provide[s] no license to lawless
conduct."68
The Court's notice concerns would be implicated if supervisors
were held liable on a respondeat superior basis for their subordinates'
constitutional wrongs, or if they were denied qualified immunity simply
because their subordinates violated clearly established constitutional
norms. Therefore, it makes sense to perform a separate qualified
immunity analysis for each individual defendant, assessing whether they
all had "fair warning that their conduct violated the Constitution."69 As
the Second Circuit noted in Poe v. Leonard, "[j]ust as [a supervisory
official's] liability depends in part upon his actions and choices, his
eligibility for immunity must depend upon those same choices." 70 But
the bifurcated approach to qualified immunity stacks the decks too
heavily in the defendant's favor, protecting supervisory officials who
clearly were on notice that their failure to supervise had constitutional
66. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. at 641 (observing that "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some
cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and .. . in such
cases those officials-like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be
lawful-should not be held personally liable").
67. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at
202 ("The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.").
68. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); see also Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 591 (1998) (noting that "[w]hile there is obvious unfairness in imposing
liability-indeed, even in compelling the defendant to bear the burdens of discovery and
trial-for engaging in conduct that was objectively reasonable when it occurred, no such
unfairness can be attributed to holding one accountable for actions that she knew, or
should have known, violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff').
69. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
70. Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2002).
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implications. A supervisor whose subordinate has violated clearly
established law and who herself satisfies the pre-Iqbal standard of
supervisory liability-because she was deliberately indifferent to that
violation, or knew of and acquiesced in it-cannot be said to have simply
made a "reasonable mistake." Under those circumstances, a reasonable
supervisory official would have realized that her conduct would "cause[]
[the plaintiff] to be subjected to a constitutional violation" within the
meaning of § 198371 and immunity can fairly be denied without
undermining any of the policies underlying the defense. Thus, the Third
Circuit had the better view in Carter v. City of Philadelphia in deciding
that qualified immunity is unavailable to supervisors in cases where the
plaintiff can establish the deliberate indifference required to satisfy the
standard of supervisory liability.72
Making a second-level "clearly established" inquiry by asking
whether the supervisory liability standard is clearly met gives high-
ranking public officials yet another bite at an apple that in many cases is
already pretty well masticated.7 3 It is the plaintiffs constitutional rights
that must be clearly established, not the supervisor's deliberate
indifference or the law governing the standard of supervisory liability. 7 4
Moreover, the notion that a supervisor can be deliberately
indifferent to a subordinate's violation of clearly established law and at
the same time can act in "objective legal reasonableness" or make a
"reasonable mistake" is incongruous on its face. Rather, it is much
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
72. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
"[i]f [the plaintiff] succeeds in establishing that the [supervisory] defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights-as [he] must in order to recover under
section 1983-then a fortiori their conduct was not objectively reasonable" as required
for qualified immunity).
73. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 214 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that "an officer whose conduct is objectively unreasonable under [the
Fourth Amendment standard for excessive force claims] should find no shelter under a
sequential qualified immunity test," and criticizing the majority's view to the contrary as
"[d]ouble counting 'objective reasonableness"'); Jon 0. Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law
Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460 (1978) (maintaining that "[s]urely [an]
officer could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful arrest,
for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent police officer could
not reasonably believe there was probable cause").
74. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Blum, supra note 48, at 668. But cf Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 468 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Garwood, J., dissenting)
(seemingly taking the position that qualified immunity is appropriate if it is not clearly
established that the defendant was acting "under color" of state law within the meaning of
§ 1983).
75. See Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting "the
awkwardness of the conceptual fit" in assuming that "deliberate indifference cases are
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more accurate to say that "the unlawfulness [was] apparent" to the
supervisory official and thus to deny her immunity. Perhaps it is not
surprising, then, that the lower courts' qualified immunity analysis in
cases involving supervisors has been hopelessly tied to the merits of the
supervisory liability standard.16  Opinions evaluating whether it was
clearly established that supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiffs constitutional rights have been analytically indistinguishable
from those assessing whether they were in fact deliberately indifferent. 77
amenable to standard qualified immunity analysis"). Cf Blum, supra note 48, at 657-58
(citing conflicting case law on this issue); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 277 (2000) (observing that "qualified immunity
becomes functionally irrelevant" with respect to constitutional rights that "require[] a
motivation widely understood to be reprehensible").
76. See Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d at 7 (pointing out that "deliberate
indifference . .. is customarily a merits-related topic," and therefore "discerning whether
a particular [supervisor's] behavior passes the context-specific test of objective legal
reasonableness to some extent collapses the separate 'qualified immunity' and 'merits'
inquiries into a single analytic unit"); see also Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270
(11th Cir. 1999) (admitting that "the matter is not without nuance" because "[a]fter all,
where there is an appeal from the denial of.. . qualified immunity. . . , we can and do
review the underlying merits issue that is swept along in the appeal," but rejecting the
concurring judge's view that granting qualified immunity "where no wrong has been
committed [by the supervisor] ... is a non sequitur" and therefore summary judgment
should be awarded in such cases "on the merits, not on qualified immunity grounds");
Mark R. Brown, Qualified Immunity and Interlocutory Fact-finding in the Courts of
Appeals, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 1317 (2010) (predicting that Iqbal will "encourage more
interlocutory fact-finding on appeal").
The First Circuit goes on in Camilo-Robles to suggest, however, that the overlap is
"more apparent than real" given that different standards apply at the qualified immunity
and merits stages, and therefore "rights-violating conduct that a factfinder could conclude
supports a determination of liability nonetheless may fall within the wider band of
objective legal reasonableness (and thus would support a judicial determination of
qualified immunity)." Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d at 7 n.4. While this
observation might be true in cases where the qualified immunity inquiry focuses on
whether a particular substantive constitutional right was clearly established, it is less apt
when qualified immunity turns on the objective reasonableness of deliberate indifference.
77. Many of the appellate court cases discussed elsewhere in this article could be
cited here; opinions disposing of qualified immunity claims advanced by supervisory
officials tend to read no differently from merits decisions on supervisory liability.
Compare Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that doctor
who supervised prison medical staff was entitled to post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law because there was "no evidence that [he] had notice of, instituted, or
became aware of any unconstitutional policy, practice or act, or that he was grossly
negligent in supervising his subordinates"), with Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch.
Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying qualified immunity to school
superintendent and principal, reasoning that the plaintiffs alleged that the supervisors
"were aware that [a teacher] had assaulted students on four previous occasions" and
nevertheless "failed to act on these reports so as to prevent future occurrences").
Compare also Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th
Cir. 2007) (denying motion to dismiss, noting on the merits that the complaint alleged the
defendants "fail[ed] to train special education teachers, or to hire qualified individuals to
work in special education classrooms," and "abdicated their duty to report and discipline
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This overlap further demonstrates that the bifurcated approach to
qualified immunity is unwarranted.
Accordingly, a supervisory official's qualified immunity claim
ought to be defeated if her subordinate violated the plaintiffs clearly
established rights and the supervisor herself was deliberately indifferent
to those rights. But even the bifurcated approach to qualified immunity,
while overprotecting supervisory officials in situations where they
clearly are on notice that they face constitutional tort liability, is an
improvement over the complete abandonment of supervisory
accountability. The bifurcated approach may be somewhat awkward,
redundant, and "complicated," 7 8 but the courts seem to have no trouble
applying it-and it has not hindered them from routinely dismissing suits
filed against supervisory officials on qualified immunity grounds. 79 By
calling into question the doctrine of supervisory liability and requiring
proof that each government defendant independently violated the
plaintiffs rights, the Iqbal opinion threatens to gift high-ranking
government officials with a defense that more closely resembles absolute
immunity.80 The next section attempts to gauge how serious that threat is
LiSanti when they first became aware of the alleged abuses"), with id. (finding that
complaint adequately alleged violation of clearly established rights by charging that the
supervisors "demonstrated disregard of their responsibilities in hiring, training,
supervising, disciplining and reporting abuses committed by LiSanti").
78. Nahmod, supra note 11, at 304.
79. See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 378 (5th
Cir. 2005) (concluding that supervisors of police officer involved in fatal use of force
were entitled to immunity despite district court's finding of evidence "indicating that
[Officer] Hill fired his weapon on three occasions during training exercises when the
scenarios did not call for the firing of a weapon; a background investigation report
indicating that Hill had a tendency to act too aggressively; and testimony of Randy Cole,
a citizen who was pulled over by Hill for a traffic violation, indicating that Hill behaved
'like a psycho' and was 'going to kill somebody"'); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 147,
143, 127 (2d Cir. 2002) (granting qualified immunity to police captain responsible for
supervising trooper who secretly videotaped a woman participating in a police training
video while she was undressing, though acknowledging that "the lingering shot of the
victim's upper thighs in the static crime scene might concern some supervisors" and the
trooper's personnel file showed a "troubled past" and a "problematic history," including
an incident before the captain took command where the trooper received "an
unsatisfactory performance evaluation report for photographing several young women in
swimsuits in a private bedroom while filming a public safety announcement").
80. See Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 217, 227
(2010) (arguing on the facts of lqbal that "[i]t is hardly fantastical or even implausible to
think that [the Attorney General and F.B.I. Director] would have ordered prison officials
to 'take the gloves off' when interrogating Arab and Muslim men"); see also Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 619 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Parker, J., dissenting) (pointing out
that "[r]arely, if ever, will a plaintiff be in the room when officials formulate an
unconstitutional policy later implemented by their subordinates," even though "it is this
kind of executive overreaching that the Bill of Rights sought to guard against, not simply
the frolic and detour of a few 'bad apples'); Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339,
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and precisely what impact the Iqbal decision was intended to have on the
nature of supervisory liability.
III. IQBAL'S IMPACT
The Supreme Court's opinion in Iqbal characterized supervisory
liability as a "misnomer," requiring evidence that "each Government-
official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution."8 ' The dissenters objected that the majority
opinion was thereby "eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely" 82
(although elsewhere they seemed to hedge their bets a bit).
Nevertheless, while the post-Iqbal record in the courts of appeals is still
inconclusive, there is reason to hope that the Court did not, in three quick
paragraphs, work a sea change in the rules governing supervisory
liability.
A. Limiting the Damage
On the facts before it, the Supreme Court concluded, Iqbal "must
plead sufficient factual matter to show that [Attorney General Ashcroft
and F.B.I. Director Mueller] adopted and implemented the detention
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose
of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin." 84 If
this language was meant to apply across the board-to limit supervisory
liability to cases where plaintiffs can demonstrate both that the
supervisor acted purposely and also that the subordinate who directly
violated their rights was simply carrying out directives "adopted and
implemented" by the supervisory defendant-then Iqbal does indeed go
a long way towards withdrawing any constitutional tort remedy against
high-ranking government officials. But there are three reasons to
hesitate before giving the Court's opinion such an expansive reading.
First, while the Court certainly refused to impose liability on a
supervisor who did not act with the state of mind necessary to violate the
substantive constitutional right in question, the requisite state of mind-
as the Court expressly acknowledged in Iqbal-"will vary with the
constitutional provision at issue."8 5 Thus, Iqbal's claim that he suffered
358 (3d Cir. 1999) (observing that a plaintiff "cannot be expected to know, without
discovery, exactly what training policies were in place or how they were adopted").
81. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 1948 (2009).
82. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discounting the possibility that the majority
was simply "narrowing the scope of supervisory liability").
83. See id. at 1955, 1958 (speaking in more equivocal terms, using qualifiers like
"apparently" and "presumably").
84. Id. at 1948-49 (majority opinion).
85. Id. at 1948.
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"invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth
Amendments" necessitated proof that each defendant "acted with
discriminatory purpose," a requirement that could not be satisfied, the
Court said, by arguing that "a supervisor's mere knowledge of his
subordinate's discriminatory purpose amount[ed] to the supervisor's
violating the Constitution."8 6  But the reason the Court rejected that
proposition was linked to the underlying constitutional claim, which
required "purpose rather than knowledge" in order to impose liability on
either "the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination" or the
"official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities." 87
Thus, while the Court clearly mandated that the supervisory
defendant must share the state of mind required to prove a violation of
the constitutional provision at issue, that mental state requirement
fluctuates depending on the particular right in question. As a result,
Iqbal's reference to discriminatory intent does not support requiring
proof of purpose, for example, in cases involving claims that police used
excessive force in making an arrest, which are governed by the Fourth
Amendment standard of "objective reasonableness,"8 or in suits, like
those based on the Eighth Amendment, where the constitutional
provision requires proof of deliberate indifference. 8 9
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1949. Cf Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 589 (7th Cir. 2010)
(denying principal's request for qualified immunity on summary judgment on the ground
that a jury "could reasonably infer" (even though "it would not be required" to do so) that
the principal engaged in purposeful gender discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because the evidence "would allow a jury to conclude that [the
principal] knew about [the teacher's] abuse of the girls and deliberately helped cover it up
by misleading the girls' parents, the superintendent, and other administrators").
88. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 383 (2007) (noting that Fourth Amendment claims require the Court to "slosh our
way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness'). But cf Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) ("Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an
intentional acquisition of physical control," and therefore "a Fourth Amendment seizure
[occurs] ... only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied.").
89. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Though Professor
Nahmod is critical of the lower courts' pre-Iqbal approach to supervisory liability and
interprets Iqbal as adopting an alternative model, he agrees that the impact of the Court's
decision may be limited. See Nahmod, supra note 11, at 280-82. In fact, he maintains
that Iqbal "may have expanded the scope of supervisory liability" in cases where a
violation of the substantive constitutional right at issue requires proof of a state of mind
less culpable than deliberate indifference. Id. at 297. For example, Nahmod concludes
that Iqbal would impose liability in a Fourth Amendment case on a supervisor who
"acted in an objectively unreasonable way in failing to supervise" the offending police
officer-a standard of culpability more favorable to the plaintiff than the deliberate
indifference standard widely used prior to Iqbal in assessing supervisory liability. Id.
Likewise, he believes the Court's ruling "may not make much real world difference" in
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Admittedly, the fact that the Justices in the Iqbal majority viewed
proof of the requisite state of mind as a necessary condition for liability
does not mean they also believed it was sufficient. Moreover, the
Court's opinion does not expressly assert that evidence of the relevant
mental state, coupled with a failure to supervise, suffices to establish a
supervisor's culpability for constitutional injuries inflicted by a
subordinate. But the second reason to pause before assuming the Court
meant to foreclose this argument is that, borrowing from criminal law
terminology, the Court's clear focus in Iqbal was on the mens rea
component of the plaintiffs case and not the actus reus half of the
equation. While the Court's reference, in the language quoted above, to
detention policies "adopted and implemented" by Attorney General
Ashcroft and F.B.I. Director Mueller may have been intended to describe
the actus reus burden Iqbal had to satisfy, it was tied to the specific
allegations of his complaint.90 Therefore, this language cannot justifiably
be read as broadly limiting supervisory liability to cases with a
comparable level of supervisory involvement.
Moreover, this language implicitly assumes that the Court's
requirement of constitutional misconduct on the part of each defendant
was not meant to be taken literally-to absolve a high-ranking public
official from liability simply because she was not on the scene actually
participating in the constitutional violation. Presumably, therefore, a
supervisor who ordered or instructed a subordinate to act in an
unconstitutional manner, or who, in the words of the Iqbal Court,
"adopted and implemented the ... policies" being carried out by the
subordinate,9 ' would not escape liability simply because she was in the
office catching up on paperwork when her directives were carried out.9 2
Eighth Amendment litigation because the same deliberate indifference on the part of the
supervisor is required by the pre-Iqbal standards governing supervisory liability and, post
Iqbal, by virtue of the Eighth Amendment itself. Id. (As he points out, however, see id.
at 298 n.95, the "objective" definition of deliberate indifference used in the context of
municipal failure-to-train cases, see supra note 48, is less strict than the "subjective"
definition the Supreme Court has applied in Eighth Amendment cases. See Kinports,
supra note 2, at 160-61.)
90. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942 (noting that "[a]s to these two petitioners, the
complaint alleges that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent
to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin");
see also id. at 1944 ("The pleading names Ashcroft as the 'principal architect' of the
policy, and identifies Mueller as 'instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and
implementation."') (quoting First Amended Complaint at % 10-11).
91. Id. at 1949.
92. For examples of such cases, see, e.g., Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753,
765 (11th Cir. 2010) (denying qualified immunity where plaintiffs alleged that
supervisory police officials "violated the Protesters' First Amendment rights in their
supervisory capacities by directing the subordinate officers to use less-than-lethal
weapons to disperse a large crowd of allegedly peaceful demonstrators and by failing to
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Continuing the criminal law analogy, a supervisor who "adopted
and implemented" the policies being enforced by the subordinate directly
responsible for violating the plaintiffs rights would have committed a
sufficient act to make her accountable for her subordinate's wrongdoing
on an accomplice liability theory. But so would the supervisor who
failed to act in the face of a legal duty, i.e., who inadequately supervised
the offending subordinate and thereby neglected her job
responsibilities.9 3  Just as the actus reus requirement for accomplice
liability would be satisfied in both situations-by the supervisor's
voluntary act in one and by her culpable omission in the other-so
constitutional tort liability is appropriate in both cases.94 Given that
Iqbal's brief reference to the plaintiffs actus reus burden focused on the
specific allegations before it, therefore, the Court's opinion should not be
read as denying a remedy against supervisors based on a finding that they
failed to fulfill their "superintendent responsibilities." 95
stop the subordinate officers from doing the same"); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590
F.3d 31, 50 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding that police sergeant was not entitled to qualified
immunity in Fourth Amendment case alleging that another officer, "acting pursuant to
'orders imparted by [the sergeant],' pressured the doctors to conduct a medical procedure
to remove the illusory cell phone from plaintiff s bowels"); al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d
949, 976, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting qualified immunity defense where plaintiff
alleged that former Attorney General Ashcroft "purposely instructed his subordinates to
bypass the plain reading of the [material witness] statute" and accordingly that "he was
arrested without probable cause pursuant to a general policy, designed and implemented
by Ashcroft"); Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 732-33 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that the jury likely found search team leader liable because he ordered another prison
guard to use pepper spray on the plaintiffs).
93. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(a), at 673 (4th ed. 2003)
(observing that "one may become an accomplice by not preventing a crime which he has
a duty to prevent"). The more difficult hurdle in a criminal case would be to satisfy the
mens rea requirement for accomplice liability-to establish that the supervisor's failure
to act was purposeful, "with intent to promote or facilitate the crime." Id. at 673 n.47. In
the constitutional tort context, Iqbal makes clear that the particular constitutional
provision at issue supplies the necessary mental state. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
94. The analogy to criminal law is not perfect given that constitutional tort litigation
is more interested in compensating for losses and less focused on punishing and assessing
blame (although both share a deterrent purpose). See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267-68 (1981). While it may therefore be appropriate to impose a
higher burden on prosecutors trying to establish criminal culpability, at minimum public
officials should not be held to a lower standard than criminal defendants. Cf 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (2000) (criminal counterpart to § 1983 requires proof that the defendant acted
"willfully"). But cf Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002) (holding that
government officials sued under § 1983 have "the same right to fair notice" as those
prosecuted under § 242, and rejecting the position that criminal defendants are "entitled
to a degree of notice "'substantially higher than the 'clearly established' standard used to
judge qualified immunity""') (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 263 (1997)
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996))).
95. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
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Third, and finally, prior to Iqbal, some courts of appeals equated the
standards governing supervisory liability with constitutional misconduct
on the part of the supervisor herself.96 If the Supreme Court intended to
endorse this line of reasoning, requiring proof of constitutional
wrongdoing by each defendant would not undermine the lower courts'
pre-Iqbal approach to supervisory liability (assuming, of course, that
Iqbal's mental state requirements are satisfied as to every defendant).
B. The Post-Iqbal Record
The record in the federal courts of appeals since Iqbal is somewhat
sparse, and does not yet reliably indicate how expansively the courts will
interpret the Supreme Court's ruling. In the most highly publicized of
these decisions, the Ninth Circuit in al-Kidd v. Ashcroft cited its pre-
Iqbal precedents and concluded that "[a]ny one of these bases [of
supervisory liability] will suffice to establish the personal involvement of
the defendant in the constitutional violation."98 The court of appeals
likewise rejected former Attorney General Ashcroft's contention that the
plaintiff was required to demonstrate that Ashcroft "actually instruct[ed]
his subordinates to bypass the plain text of the [material witness]
statute," reasoning that the plaintiffs complaint sufficiently alleged facts
to support both the theory that Ashcroft "knowing[ly] fail[ed] to act in
the light of even unauthorized abuses" and that he "purposely used the
material witness statute to preventatively detain suspects." 99 Writing
96. See supra note 20. See also Nahmod, supra note 3, at 12 n.74 (assuming that a
supervisor who has the state of mind necessary to prove a constitutional violation and
whose "negligent conduct causes [a subordinate] to act unconstitutionally" will be
exposed to liability on the grounds that the supervisor "both violated the constitution and,
through [the subordinate], caused the constitutional deprivation").
97. For post-Iqbal cases illustrating this point, see Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d
583, 591 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting, in a case alleging child sexual abuse in violation of due
process, that when a supervisory defendant satisfies the circuit court's pre-Iqbal standard
of supervisory liability, that "actor's deliberate indifference deprives someone of his or
her protected liberty interest in bodily integrity [and] that actor violates the Constitution,
regardless of whether the actor is a supervisor or subordinate"); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 1005, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("A person deprives another of a constitutional
right where that person 'does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts,
or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation of which the complaint is made."') (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978,
988 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d
740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978))).
98. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing complaint
alleging that plaintiff was detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to
former Attorney General Ashcroft's policy of misusing the federal material witness
statute "to arrest and detain terrorism suspects about whom they did not have sufficient
evidence to arrest on criminal charges but wished to hold preventively or to investigate
further").
99. Id. at 975-76.
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separately, however, one judge thought it "doubtful" that the circuit
court's prior supervisory liability standards "survived Iqbal."'00  In
support, he relied on Iqbal's statement that "Ashcroft could not be held
liable for his 'knowledge and acquiescence' in his subordinates' alleged
unconstitutional discrimination against Muslim men after 9/11," but
instead that "[p]urpose rather than knowledge" was required in order to
impose liability in that case.' 0  The al-Kidd majority found it
unnecessary to determine "whether the [Iqbal] Court's comments relate
solely to discrimination claims which have an intent element," given
their conclusion that al-Kidd "plausibly pleads 'purpose' rather than just
'knowledge"' on the part of the former Attorney General. 102
Petitioning for rehearing en banc in al-Kidd, the Attorney General
urged a broad reading of Iqbal, interpreting the Supreme Court's opinion
as articulating a general rule that "'knowledge and acquiescence' is
insufficient to impose supervisory liability," and criticizing the Ninth
Circuit's opinion on the grounds that it "mistakenly characterized Iqbal
as requiring only that the supervisor 'was involved in the constitutional
deprivation.,,10 Although the court of appeals declined to hear the case
en banc, the author of the panel opinion wrote a separate concurrence
which included the puzzling assertion that "[u]nder Iqbal, al-Kidd had to
'plead sufficient factual matter to show that [Ashcroft] adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue' not for some neutral, lawful
reason but for an unlawful purpose"'0-even though the panel had
declined to decide whether Iqbal's intent requirement extended to Fourth
Amendment cases like al-Kidd.'os
Mirroring the confusion evident from the al-Kidd opinions, several
other courts of appeals have cautioned that Iqbal "may call into
question" the lower courts' standards governing supervisory liability,
though ultimately finding it unnecessary to resolve that issue.10 6 Others
100. Id. at 992 n.13 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
102. 580 F.3d at 976 n.25 (therefore declining to decide whether the Ninth Circuit's
pre-Iqbal standard of supervisory liability and the Iqbal Court's reference to "knowledge
and acquiescence" are "distinct" standards).
103. Petition for Rehearing en Banc at 19, al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (No. 06-36059) (quoting al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d at 974 n.23).
104. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010) (Smith, J., concurring
in denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-49).
105. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d at 976 n.25.
106. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 275 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal's
requirement that each defendant must violate the Constitution, but declining to reach the
issue because the plaintiffs had not satisfied even the pre-Iqbal supervisory liability
standard); see also Bayer v. Monroe County Children & Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190
n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (warning that Iqbal makes it "uncertain whether proof of.. . personal
knowledge, with nothing more, would provide a sufficient basis" for supervisory liability
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have cited their pre-Iqbal supervisory liability rules as if they were still
authoritative without expressly trying to reconcile them with the Court's
decision' 0 7-although one of these cases involved allegations that the
supervisory defendants were responsible for ordering their subordinates
to act in an unconstitutional manner, which presumably would support
liability even under an expansive reading of Iqbal.'os
It remains to be seen, then, how the doctrine of supervisory liability
will fare in the wake of Iqbal. But absent further clarification from the
Supreme Court, the decision need not be interpreted as a wholesale
rejection of the lower courts' approach to supervisory liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has shown surprisingly little interest in the
questions surrounding government supervisors' liability under a
constitutional tort regime that otherwise has attracted a good deal of
attention from the Court. Only two Supreme Court opinions-Rizzo v.
Goode'09 and now Ashcroft v. Iqbaluo-have addressed this important
and widely litigated issue, and then only briefly and in passing. Equally
surprising, the Court in its most recent foray into this arena saw fit to call
into question decades of uniform lower court practice in a cursory three-
paragraph analysis that relied exclusively on the misguided assumption
that the doctrine of supervisory liability is indistinguishable from
respondeat superior. By referring to supervisory liability as a
in a procedural due process case, but finding it unnecessary to address that question given
the court's conclusion that qualified immunity would protect the defendant "whether his
alleged liability under § 1983 were to derive from his own conduct or from his
knowledge of [his subordinate's] conduct").
107. See Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
plaintiffs who alleged that principal "actively conceal[ed] reports of [child sexual] abuse
and creat[ed] an atmosphere that allowed abuse to flourish" were "seek[ing] to do no
more than hold [the principal] liable 'for ... her own misconduct,"' and thus "their
substantive due process theory is not foreclosed by Iqbal") (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949); Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 48-51 (1st Cir. 2009) (relying on pre-
Iqbal standards of supervisory liability, though ultimately dismissing the claims against
the supervisors because the complaint contained "precisely the type of 'the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me' allegation that the Supreme Court has determined should not be
given credence when standing alone") (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949).
108. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). Cf Padilla v.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss filed by
former Deputy Attorney General John Yoo, and distinguishing Iqbal on the grounds that
the plaintiff "alleges with specificity that Yoo was involved" in constitutional
wrongdoing-i.e., that he "personally recommended Mr. Padilla's unlawful military
detention as a suspected enemy combatant and then wrote opinions to justify the use of
unlawful interrogation methods against persons suspected of being enemy combatants").
109. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
110. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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"misnomer" 11 and mandating that plaintiffs prove a constitutional
violation on the part of each government defendant, the Iqbal Court
arguably retreated from the lower courts' unanimous view that
supervisors can be held accountable if they were deliberately indifferent
to, or knew of and acquiesced in, the constitutional wrongs inflicted by
their subordinates.
Nevertheless, the opinion, stripped to its essential holding, does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the Court meant to fundamentally
change the landscape of constitutional tort jurisprudence without the
benefit of briefing or oral argument. The Court's attention was directed
to the mental state required to impose liability on a high-ranking
government official, and its references to discriminatory purpose and
supervisory policy-making were linked to the specific allegations
contained in Iqbal's complaint. Moreover, following the lead of some
federal appellate courts, the Court may have assumed that supervisory
officials do violate constitutional norms when they act with the state of
mind required to violate the constitutional provision in question and fail
to adequately supervise the subordinate who inflicted constitutional
injury. Such a failure to act in the face of a legal duty would suffice to
establish criminal culpability on an accomplice liability theory, and
public officials should at the very least be expected to live up to that
standard. Hopefully, it will not take another thirty years for the Court to
revisit this issue and clarify the scope of its holding. In the meantime,
courts and litigants need not assume that Iqbal was intended to work a
sea change in the rules governing supervisory accountability for
constitutional torts.
If the Court does take another-and a serious-look at the question
of supervisory liability, it should acknowledge, as have the lower courts,
that the compensatory and deterrence goals underlying Bivens and
§ 1983 call for a meaningful remedy against those responsible for injury
who are best able to institute the reforms needed to prevent further
infringement of constitutional rights. Moreover, if the Court does
reconsider this issue, the complications that arise in applying the
qualified immunity defense afford no justification for abandoning the
doctrine of supervisory liability. But instead of the redundant and overly
protective bifurcated approach to qualified immunity adopted by some
federal courts in cases involving supervisory public officials, the policy
concerns underlying qualified immunity are best accommodated by
making the defense unavailable to supervisory officials who are
deliberately indifferent to (or know of and acquiesce in) their
subordinates' violation of clearly established constitutional law. Under
111. Id. at 1949.
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such circumstances, supervisors do not act in an "objectively reasonable"
manner,112 the "unlawfulness" of their conduct is "apparent,"ll3 and a fair
balance of the competing policy interests therefore mandates a denial of
immunity.
112. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591 (1998).
113. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
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